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SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1951

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
CONTEST OF UTILITY RATE -

LIMITATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

-

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY

New Mexico. A ratemaking case with an unusual twist was decided in State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Company.1 A public
utility corporation had applied to the State Corporation Commission for authority substantially to increase its rates for telephone
service. The Commission approved an increase of approximately
fifty per cent, the largest proportional rate boost in the company's
history.
The Attorney General of the State of New Mexico felt that such
action was unreasonable to the public and commenced an action
in the supreme court to set aside the order. The court refused to
interfere with the Commission's action. Conceding that the rate
may very well have been unreasonable, the court pointed out that
the Commission represented the public and ruled that its orders
are conclusively presumed to be reasonable so far as the public
was concerned.
Two objections may be made to the holding in this case. First,
ratemaking is a quasi-legislative act, but it is not suggested that
the whole plenary power of the legislature is invested in the Commission. The common law prescribes the rule that the rate shall be
reasonable, and the statute delegating this power to the Commis.
sion necessarily implies the same limitation.2 The courts should
review decisions of administrative agencies to protect the public
as well as the private parties against arbitrary action or errors
154

N. M. 315, 224 P. 2d 155 (1950).
Cf. Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Light and Power Co., 191 N. Y.
123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908).
2
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of law. Nor can it be maintained that the state is precluded from
maintaining an action on behalf of the public against a public
agency. The modem view of the Supreme Court of the United
States is that a government may create a justiciable controversy
against itself acting in another capacity.'

TranscontinentalBus System v. State CorporationCommission'
represented the culmination of five years of litigation over the
adequacy of bus service between Las Cruces and Hot Springs. In
1946 the Corporation Commission granted certificates of convenience and necessity to operate passenger bus service to three
applicants. One of these, the plaintiff's assignor, had received his
hearing months before, and the Commission purported to consider
the effect of his proposed operations on the adequacy of the service but took no evidence on this point. The order of the Commission accordingly was based on some sort of evidence outside the
record.
In a suit to set aside the order, the district judge ruled that the
order was erroneous and was about to remand to the Commission
when the supreme court granted a writ of prohibition against the
remand on the ground that an invalid order could not be sent back
to the issuing agency.5 In the course of the opinion the court suggested that the district judge
... might conclude that the order was reasonable and lawful in part,
and invalid in part. In such event
he could amend the order so as
6
to approve the valid part only.
On remand, the district judge followed the procedure suggested
and amended the Commission's order. Another appeal to the supreme court followed, in which the court reversed itself and held
that the separation of powers inherent in the New Mexico Constitution prohibited judicial revision of administrative orders, The
court concluded that on review of an administrative decision the
judiciary may only determine whether the order is lawful and
8 United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U. S. 426 (1949).
456 N. M. 158, 241 P. 2d 829 (1952).
5State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Service v. Carmody, 53 N.M. 367, 208 P. 2d
1073 (1949).

6 208 P. 2d at 1080. Emphasis supplied.
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reasonable, and upon a contrary finding may only vacate the
action and rescind the certificate granted thereunder.
An important question of administrative remedies was raised in
the celebrated case of Zellers v. Huff.7 The petitioning taxpayers
and parents of school children sought the dismissal of a group of
public school teachers, all members of Roman Catholic orders, on
the ground that their allegiance to the Roman church under its
laws and their past record of infusing Catholic doctrine into their
teaching rendered them incompetent to instruct in public schools.
The Legislature had provided that the State Board of Education
could dismiss teachers for cause after a hearing! The petitioners
in this case requested the Board to take such action but were
denied a hearing on the ground that dismissal proceedings were
initiated solely on the Board's own motion. Nevertheless, when
they took the case to court, they were met with the objection that
administrative remedies had not been exhausted.
The supreme court held that this statutory provision did not
grant the public an adequate remedy against incompetent teachers.
If a purely discretionary hearing by the Board were considered
prerequisite to court action, interested parties could be denied relief against arbitrary and capricious action of the Board.
SUFFICIENCY OF LEGISLATIVE STANDARD

Oklahoma. The United States Court of Appeals sustained the
constitutionality of Oklahoma's fire hazard abatement statute in
American Home Fire Assurance Company v. Midwest Enterprise
Company9 against a contention that it vested arbitrary power in the
fire marshal and his subordinates without sufficient standards.
The critical part of the statute allows the state fire marshal, fire
chiefs or sheriffs to order the destruction of any structure upon
a finding that "any building or other structure which for the want
of proper repair, or by reason of age and dilapidated condition, or
7 55 N. M. 501, 236 P. 2d 949 (1951).
8 N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. §§ 55-105, 55-1113.

9189 F. 2d 528 (10th Cir. 1951).
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for any cause" is especially liable to fire, or "is so situated as to
endanger other buildings or property," or is "so occupied that a
fire would endanger persons and property therein." 1 Other portions of the statute allow appeal to the fire marshal if destruction
is ordered by an inferior officer and thereafter an appeal de novo
to the district court.
The court held that while the statute was less succinctly phrased
than might be desired, it could not be said to vest arbitrary power
in the officers administering it, especially in view of the provision
for judicial review.
NECESSITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS PREVAILING WAGE RATES -

DETERMINATION OF

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

CIVIL SERVICE DEMOTION

Texas. The requirement of findings in orders of administrative
agencies has come under judicial review in several Texas decisions
during the past year. Thompson v. Hovey Petroleum Company"
and its companion case, Thompson v. Railroad Commission,12 reversing decisions of the court of civil appeals, arose on appeal
from the order of the Railroad Commission granting the Hovey
Petroleum Company authority to transport certain chemicals by
truck. The order summarized at length the testimony heard by the
Commission, and then concluded,
The Commission further finds from the evidence and its own records,

after carefully considering the existing transportation facilities and demand for and the need of additional service, that the service and facilities of the existing carriers serving the territory are inadequate. 18

It was contended by appellant that such an order failed to meet
the statutory requirements applicable to special carriers:
... The order of the commission granting said application and cer-

tificate issued thereunder shall be void unless the commission shall set
10 74 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 317.
11 -----.
Tex............. 236 S. W. 2d 491 (1951), rev'g 232 S. W. 2d 146 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951).
12_............. Tex ---............ 240 S. W. 2d 759 (1951), rev'g 232 S. W. 2d 139 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951).
is 240 S. W. 2d at 762.
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forth in its order full and complete findings of fact pointing out in
detail the inadequacies of existing carriers .... 14
The supreme court, agreeing with this contention, declared that the
"findings of fact" contemplated by the statute must include evidentiary facts, not merely the ultimate conclusion that existing
service was inadequate.
A mix-up followed the decision in the Hovey case. On the assumption that an order like the one quoted above was void (as indeed the statute declared it to be), the court of civil appeals reversed its previous holding and allowed a collateral attack on such
order in Roberdeau v. Railroad Commission. 5 On rehearing in
the second Thompson case, however, the supreme court held that,
while the order was subject to direct attack, it was not void in the
sense of permitting collateral attack to be made upon it. The
Roberdeau case accordingly was reversed again.16.
Contrary to the underlying approach of the supreme court in
the Thompson cases is a recent decision of the court of civil appeals in Merchants Fast Motor Lines v. Newman. 7 In this case,
presenting a contest of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission
granting a certificate of convenience and necessity to a motor carrier, the contestant's evidence showed that upon the administrative
hearing the examiner had taken longhand notes of the testimony
and then had privately conferred with the Commission without
filing a written report. This procedure was not in conformity with
the provisions of the applicable statute which states:
... [I]t shall be his [the examiner's] duty promptly to make a written

report to the Commission recommending disposition of said application. Such report and recommendation shall be accompanied by a
brief narrative statement of the evidence.... 18
The court held, nevertheless, that the irregularities set out were
not such as to invalidate the Commission's order. The requirement
of a written report, said the court, was for the benefit of the ComTEx. Rav. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 911b, § 5a(d).
15 239 S.W. 2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
,242 S.W. 2d 881 (1951).
16 Roberdeau v. Railroad Commission, - -...... Tex .----------17 236 S.W. 2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref.
8
' TrX. Ray. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 911b, § 14(b).
14
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mission and could be waived by it. In effect, the clear-cut mandate
of the statute was construed as merely directory.
This decision, if it remains the law, will remove an important
procedural safeguard of the rights of parties before administrative
agencies. Where no written report of the findings of the hearing
officer is submitted to the Commission, the applicant can have no
adequate opportunity to contest his undisclosed findings in any
subsequent hearing before the Commission.
The Supreme Court of the United States frequently has lashed
out against this sort of procedure. In the First Morgan case"
Chief Justice Hughes argued,
Those who are brought into contest with the Government in a quasi
judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are entitled
to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard
upon its proposals before it issues its final command.
The proposed Texas Administrative Procedure Act anticipates
this problem and would rephrase the statutory provisions to avoid
the result in the Newman case 20
Texas Highway Commission v. El Paso Building and Construction
Trades Council" involved the validity of a "prevailing wage" determination of the Highway Commission in a road construction
contract, the union contending that the Commission had settled on
a figure which represented, if anything, the minimum wage.
The court pointed out that by statute,
... The term "general prevailing rate of per diem wages" shall be
the rate determined upon as such rate by the public body awarding
the contract, or authorizing the work, whose decision in the matter
shall be final.... 22
This provision was held to preclude recourse to the courts. The
19 Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 18, 19 (1937).
20 Article 13b of the proposed code reads: "The hearing officer shall prepare a
proposed decision, consisting of findings of fact and recommended order, rule, or other
action, in such form that it may be adopted as the decision in the case. Copies of the
proposed decision shall be served upon all parties, who shall then be given a reasonable
time within which to submit to the agency exceptions to the proposed decision and
briefs in support thereof."
21 ........... Tex ------, 234 S. W. 2d 857 (1950), rev'g 231 S. W. 2d 533 (Tex. Civ.
App.2 1950).
2 Tsx. REv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5159a, 14. Emphasis supplied.
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appellants contended that they had a right to review on constitutional grounds, but the court pointed out that the constitution did
not afford anyone a right to employment at a "prevailing wage."
Another important question on the scope of judicial review was
decided by the supreme court in City of Amarillo v. Hancock."

Hancock was a captain in the Amarillo Fire Department and suffered the misfortune of having a building bum to the ground
shortly after he had left the scene with his firemen, believing the
fire to be out. The Civil Service Commission reduced his rank and
pay to ordinary fireman upon recommendation of the head of the
department, although very little evidence was introduced at the
hearing to substantiate the charge that he had carried out his duties
negligently. Hancock appealed to the district court and the court
of civil appeals, which held the Commission's order void for want
of substantial supporting evidence. The supreme court, however,
reversed the lower courts on the ground that the district court had
no jurisdiction to review the order of the Commission.
Under the applicable statute jurisdiction is limited to cases of
"suspension or dismissal." 4 Since Hancock was demoted and not
dismissed or suspended, the supreme court held that he had no
statutory right to the judicial review. The court further held that
in the absence of statutory protection a public officer has no vested
property right in his rank and that demotion to a position of lesser
salary and prestige is consequently not a deprival of property
without due process of law. The constitutional basis for review
thus removed, the court held that Hancock had no standing to appeal to the courts from the order of the Commission.
E. E. Marlat.

23

24

____TeX.__

239 S. W. 2d 788 (1951).

TE. REV. CiM.

(Vernon, 1948) art. 1269m, § 18. CI. § 19 as to demotion pro-

cedure.

STAT.

